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ABSTRACT 
The security evaluation for Mail Distribution Systems focuses on certification and reliability of sensitive 
data between mail servers. The need to certify the information conveyed is a result of known weaknesses 
in the simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP). The most important consequence of these weaknesses is the 
possibility to mislead the recipient, which is achieved via spam (especially email spoofing). Email 
spoofing refers to alterations in the headers and/or the content of the message. Therefore, the authenticity 
of the message is compromised. Unfortunately, the broken link between certification and reliability of the 
information is unsolicited email (spam).  
Unlike the current practice of estimating the cost of spam, which prompts organizations to purchase and 
maintain appropriate anti-spam software, our approach offers an alternative perspective of the economic 
and moral consequences of unsolicited mail. The financial data provided in this paper show that spam is a 
major contributor to the financial and production cost of an organization, necessitating further attention. 
Additionally, this paper highlights the importance and severity of the weaknesses of the SMTP protocol, 
which can be exploited even with the use of simple applications incorporated within most commonly used 
Operating Systems (e.g. Telnet). 
As a consequence of these drawbacks Mail Distribution Systems need to be appropriate configured so as 
to provide the necessary security services to the users.  
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1. Introduction 
Information Society is stated as the one in which the creation, distribution, diffusion, use, 
integration and manipulation of information is a significant financial, political, and cultural 
activity. In this society, messages sent or received electronically by its citizens are said to be the 
cornerstone of its structure. 
Digital citizens are bound to increasingly trust the intercessors of their communication 
process, which in our case are machines that distribute electronic messages. As any machinery 
constructed until now, these systems have some weaknesses, which in some cases may cause 
significant damage by means of financial, as well as ethical, impact. 
In this paper, we address this problem, focusing on economy, as well as ethics. We propose a 
solution that focuses on increasing the amount of trust felt by users toward email messages. We 
show that certain weaknesses of the SMTP protocol can be exploited by a simple application 
such as Telnet which is incorporated within most operating systems. As a solution, we propose a 
user authorization procedure so that an unauthorized user cannot send emails.  In this way, we 
manage to appropriately configure our Mail Distribution System in order to provide the 
necessary security services to the users. 
2. Taxonomy of threat models 
Several frameworks for threat modeling have been proposed, e.g. the OCTAVE model from 
CERT [1] and the STRIDE/DREAD methodology from Microsoft [2][3].Threat modeling is 
used for the identification and prioritization of security vulnerabilities of a system. A 
classification process based on threat modeling is advantageous because it offers increased 
security. Microsoft’s STRIDE model is used to categorize different threat types. STRIDE is an 
acronym of the following concepts. 
• Spoofing. Attempt to gain access to a system using a forged identity. A compromised 
system would have access control vulnerability. 
• Tampering. Manipulation of data during communication through the network. The 
integrity of the data is threatened. 
• Repudiation. Denial of participation in a transaction. The availability of a resource is 
threatened. 
• Information disclosure. Unwanted exposure and loss of confidentiality of private data. 
• Denial of service. Attack on system availability through the depletion of system 
resources. 
• Elevation of privilege. A user with limited privileges assumes the identity of a 
privileged user to gain access to an application. The confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of a resource are threatened. 
 
DREAD is a risk-calculating mechanism. Each letter of the acronym stands for a threat 
attribute. Each of the attributes is ranked in a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 being the lowest and 10 
being the highest rating. These attributes are: 
• Damage potential. The damage that will be done if the vulnerability is exploited by the 
attacker. 
• Reproducibility. The ease of repeatedly exploiting a vulnerability. 
• Exploitability. The skill level required to exploit a vulnerability. 
• Affected users. The parties by the exploitation of a vulnerability. 
• Discoverability. The ease of exploration and discovery of a vulnerability.  
 
In this paper, we focus on spoofing and information disclosure. Spoofing is the process by 
which spammers send a message, which is a false statement, or simply intended to mislead the 
recipients. It conforms to the term of ethical hacking, since it entails gaining unauthorized access 
to computer systems [4] - provided that no data is harmed, stolen or altered in this process. 
Phishing is the main spam technique for obtaining privileged information.  It contains some of 
the attributes of spoofing, but its as main purpose is to compromise the privacy of the users. 
Therefore, ethical hacking can be used as a risk assessment technique, as proposed in [5]. 
3. Social and financial impacts 
 
We believe that the user’s trust toward the system is endangered when threats such as spam, 
phishing, email spoofing, etc. remain uncontrolled. We also believe that a human’s trust towards 
the machinery is crucial, because it reflects his capabilities. In addition to trust, however, these 
threats can have other serious consequences (exacerbated by the increased adoption of digital 
communication), as illustrated by the following scenario: a forged email containing information 
on tax return issues is sent to thousands of citizens  inviting them to provide some necessary 
documents. The consequences of such an event are fairly obvious. Apart from the impact on the 
governmental administration mechanism, there will also be financial costs to all involved parties. 
Similarly, from an engineering perspective, the cost of spam is related to the consumption of 
network or system resources, as well as to user productivity. Users must spend time to evaluate 
messages, delete spam or look for “false positives”, such as junk email messages that are not 
actually spam. Moreover, some costs arise from the types of spam and the way it affects the end-
user. Every organization that provides a Mail Distribution System tries to limit or prevent the 
traffic of junk messages on its network. Thus, there is a constant need for additional equipment 
(hardware and/or software) in order to achieve better results. The table below outlines the main 
costs of unsolicited mail. 
Overhead Transaction cost Risks Mechanical damage 
Network 
bandwidth, storage 
need and 
development or 
acquisition of 
spam detection and 
prevention 
software. 
The incremental cost of 
communications for each 
recipient individually 
along with the creation of 
a spam message that is 
multiplied by the number 
of recipients. 
Possible legal move 
and/or public 
reactions, including 
claims and 
damages. 
Implications for the 
community and/or 
communication 
channels which are 
“attacked” by spam 
Table 1: General costs of spam 
Junk mail is the primary form of unsolicited communication because it presents virtually no 
cost to the sender. As mentioned before, in a productive environment, spam affects the economy 
of an organization and the productivity of its employees.  
 
3.1. 
We used a free web-based application 
Case study 
[6] to calculate the cost of spam on a public sector 
working environment. The input and output data of this case study are outlined in Table 2. 
Input 
data 
Number of employees with email accounts 680 
Number of workdays per year per employee      230 
Average hourly wage per employee (€) 15,00 
Average number of spam emails per day per employee 25 
Number of seconds wasted with each spam message 3 
Output 
data 
 Total Corporate Cost 
of Spam 
Cost of Spam for 
Each Employee 
Financial cost (€) Per year: 48.875,00 71,88 Per day: 212,50 0,31 
Cost in terms of 
productivity (days) Per year: 215,45 7,6 
Table 2: Case study: Results of spam cost calculator 
This is a typical paradigm of a public sector organization. Average wages, as well as workdays 
per year, have been used. It is concluded that approximately 50.000€ are wasted because of 
unsolicited email distribution, within a single year. Such an amount should be considered as 
critical and it is certainly one of the first targets when a “cut-off expenses” policy is about to be 
applied by the administration. 
 Other economists’ estimations [7] refer that the cost for an entire country’s economy is 
translated into more than 9 billion Euros per year. 
4. Software apparatus 
 
4.1. 
Spoofing exploits the two main reasons why SMTP is described as weak 
Breaking in 
[8], [9]. These 
reasons are related to the user authentication process, which is taken advantage of by spammers. 
SMTP does not require user authentication; therefore, users have the opportunity to hide their 
identity. Moreover, every part of the message (headers, body, etc.) may be forged, resulting in 
the potential misrepresentation of the message by the recipient. 
Especially today, most users’ behavior is based on the hypothesis that if the source of the 
message is known (and therefore trusted), the content is reliable. Spammers can cause significant 
problems by exploiting this assumption. This method is featured in phishing and is achieved by 
the unsolicited mail. 
More specifically, the sender needs to know at least two active email addresses and the 
domain name of the mail server in which the users’ email accounts are stored. In this paper, the 
case of a mail server that is not working as an open relay is considered. The process of sending a 
falsified email is detailed below. 
 
C1
S
 
2
telnet smtp.mail.gr 25 
220 smtp.mail.gr M.T.A. 
EHLO www.test.com 
250-smtp.mail.gr 
250-PIPELINING 
250-SIZE 8192000 
250-ETRN 
250-STARTTLS 
250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN 
250-AUTH=LOGIN PLAIN 
250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES 
250-8BITMIME 
250 DSN 
MAIL FROM:<secr@mail.gr>       //sender address 
250 2.1.5 Ok  
RCPT TO:<professor@mail.gr>    //recipient address 
250 2.1.5 Ok 
DATA                           //start of message  
Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2009 13:56:45 +0300 
From: "Secretary" <secr@mail.gr> 
To: “Professors” <professor@mail.gr> 
Subject: Board of Examiners 
Reply-To: secr@mail.gr 
User-Agent: Webmail/0.2.0 
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" 
You are invited to the Board of Examiners meeting 
scheduled for Thursday 16 September 2010 at 12.30 
p.m. at the department's council room. 
 
.                             //end of message 
250 2.0.0 Ok: queued as 492381B9295 
QUIT 
221 2.0.0 Bye 
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Figure 1: SMTP session between a mail server and a mail client 
Initially, an SMTP session between the mail client and the mail server is established. When 
the “HELO/EHLO” command is executed, the mail server presents some public information 
about the functions it supports. The sender’s email address is indicated by executing the SMTP 
command “MAIL FROM:”. The recipient’s address is indicated by running the “RCPT TO:” 
command. If no error occurs, the mail server confirms the validity of these email addresses. The 
initialization of the message data occurs with the execution of the “DATA” statement. The 
message data contains the headers and body of the email that will be sent. The end of the data 
segment is signified by the dot (.) and the CR/LF (carriage return/line feed) characters. 
Subsequently, the mail server responds with the message identification code. The SMTP session 
                                                 
1 “C” stands for mail client. 
2 “S” stands for mail server. 
is terminated by the “QUIT” command. So, as a result of the sample code provided above, an 
email is sent to professor@mail.gr and the sender appears to be secr@mail.gr. 
 
4.2 
An efficient and robust solution to email spoofing is the use of User Authentication in 
combination with Real Time Blackhole Lists and Public Key Infrastructure. This implementation 
offers increased flexibility, as several tools and utilities exist that can render the Mail 
Distribution System even more secure. 
The proposed method revolves around the authentication of users over an encrypted SMTP 
session. If the authentication process is successful, the message is composed and sent 
successfully. If the authentication process fails, an error message may be shown and the process 
is terminated. 
Our implementation 
We hosted our mail server on a machine with an Intel Dual Core 2.66Mhz processor, 3GB of 
RAM, 2 SATA disks with 250GB capacity each and a 100Mbps Internet connection. The server 
runs on Gentoo Minimal 2008 and the Mail Transfer Agent (MTA) software used is Postfix [10], 
following the directions and conclusions described in [11]. Spam Assassin [12] was used as the 
main anti-spam software, Courier-IMAP [13] as the IMAP/POP3 server, and Cyrus-SASL [14] 
as the authentication back-end. 
Therefore, the SMTP session between the mail client and the mail server is as follows. 
accept RCPT TO:
MAIL 
FROM:
HELO/
EHLO DATA
AUTH 
LOGIN QUIT
incoming
connections
Authentication 
process
SuccessfulFail
 
Figure 2: Sending process using authentication in SMTP session 
After the SMTP connection is established, the client sends the “HELO/EHLO” command 
followed by its hostname or IP address. The server responds with its hostname and other 
information such as the supported message size, the supported protocols, etc. Subsequently, the 
mail client must send the “AUTH LOGIN” command to initiate the authentication procedure. 
Next, the username of the email account is sent in Base64 encoding. Afterwards, the user 
password must be sent, also in Base64 encoding. If the credentials sent match those stored in the 
user account, the process continues as described in Figure 1. In all others cases (if, for example, 
the client sends the “MAIL FROM” command before the “AUTH LOGIN” command), the mail 
server warns the client with a message such as “553 5.7.1<email address>: Sender 
address rejected: not logged in”, stops the procedure, and waits for the proper 
command for a specified amount of time. 
Using the method described above, we 
have prevented the unwanted behavior of 
unauthenticated users and the traffic of 
spoofed messages via our mail server.  
For educational purposes, we ran some 
email spoofing tests on several SMTP 
servers. These tests took place in October 
2009 and the results are presented in 
Table 3. The positive annotation within 
the “Secured” column explains that the 
vulnerability discovered, was fixed 
sometime after out trials. We refrain from 
 Mail servers Vulnerable Secured 
Academic 
Institutes 
mail.xx.yy.zz Yes No 
ulysses.xx.yy.zz Yes Yes 
mail.xx.yy.zz Yes Yes 
smtp.xx.yy.zz No Yes 
mail.xx.yy No Yes 
mail.xx.yy.zz No Yes 
Internet 
Service 
Providers 
dcmail01.xx.yy Yes No 
mailgate.xx.yy No Yes 
Governmental 
Organizations 
mail.xx.yy No Yes 
mail.xx.yy.zz No Yes 
Table 3: Vulnerable SMTP servers 
providing the fully qualified hostname of these machines due to ethical concerns [15].  
5. Conclusion and future work 
There is a constant need to ensure the authenticity and the reliability of any email, 
necessitating a firm grasp of related security risks. Thus, any Mail Distribution System needs to 
be configured so that it provides users with all the necessary services, with an emphasis on the 
reliability and the security of any communication process. Especially today, with email being the 
most commonly used communication platform, users must consider it as trustworthy and secure 
as possible. 
In addition to the above, there are alternatives for reducing and/or eliminating email spoofing. 
A potential solution is an SMTP Proxy implementation. More commonly, these proxies are used 
in the integration of anti-spam techniques into MTAs. There are many advantages of using 
SMTP Proxy, such as a reduction in overall load, an increase in the number of back-end mail 
servers, and connection management. Furthermore, SMTP Proxy cooperates with the already 
installed MTA. Another solution is the use of an Anti-Spam SMTP Proxy server [16], which is a 
transparent SMTP Proxy.  
Spam also affects the performance of mail servers due to the unnecessary processing of 
invalid mails. An efficient solution to this issue is a hybrid mail server architecture that combines 
the strengths of event-based (efficiency) and process-based (security) architectures [17]. 
Finally, using anti-spam techniques that employ digitally signed messages (Public Key 
Infrastructure) may be the most secure, flexible and robust implementation. 
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